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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
EUGENE THORPE BASSETT, Case No. 9918 
ARTHUR JEROME 
PHILLIPS, and WILLIAM D. 
MORRELL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellants were charged and convicted with 
attempting to escape from the U'tJah State Prison, 
and appeal from a judgment of guilty of :the Dis-
trict Court of the Third Judicial District upon jury 
trial. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendants were jointly tried in the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County of the ·crime 
of attempted escape and of assault upon a prison 
guard. They were found not guilty of the crime of 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
State contends that the conviction for attempt. 
ed escape should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent adopts the Statement of Facts 
as set out in the appellant's brief, except submi1ts 
the following additional supplement: 
AppelLants Arthur Jerome Phillips and William 
D. Morrell had both received dates for conditional 
termination by the State Board of Bardons 'to be· 
come effective on April 19, 19'6'6. The order of the 
Board of Pardons terminating their sentences effec· 
tive on the a:bove-mentioned date was in effect at 
the time of ~their a:ttempted escape. Appellant Eugene 
(Thorpe Ba:ssett had not been given any termination 
date, but was being held for expiration of sentence 
(R 63, 64). At the time of the attempted escape 
each appellan1t was confined in the State Prison 
pursuant to a sentence for the indeterminate period 
of five years to life for the crime of robbery (R·63). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ~PPELLANTS WERE NOT SERVING LIFE 
SENTENCES AT THE TI'ME OF THE'IR ATTEMPTED 
ESCAPE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 76-50.:2, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
Each of the defendants in the instant case 
was serving an indeterminate sentence of five years 
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to life at the time of their attempted escape and 
thl1 ir subsequent conviction for attempted escape, 
although two of the appellants, Arthur Jerome Phil-
lips and William D. Morrell, had been given pros-
p(lctiYP termination dates by the 'State Board of 
Pardons. The appellants contend tha:t, since 'several 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have held that 
a sentence for an indeterminate per'iod, including 
lifl\ is a sentence for the maximum term, they were, 
therefore, serving life sentences and could not be 
convicted of the crime of attempted escape. Mutart 
\', Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67; Lee Lim v. Davis, 
75 Utah '245, 284 P. 32'3, 76 A.L.R. 4160; State v. 
Roberts, 91 UtJah 117, 63 P.'2d 584; Cardisco v. 
Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 'P.2d 216. 
Section 76-50-2, Utah Code Annotated 19'53, 
provides: 
"Every prisoner confined in the state 
prison 'for ~a term less than life, and every 
such prisoner, while in custody of the warden, 
deputy warden or any keeper or guard in any 
convict camp, or any other place where he 
nu.y be at work or housed or kept while out-
side the state prison walls, who escapes or at-
tempts to escape from such prison, ·convict 
camp or place of work, or from any keeper 
or .guard, or from any ather place where such 
prisoner ma7 be kept, shall be imprisoned 'in 
the state prison for a term of not more than 
ten years; such second term of imprisonment 
to commence from the time he would other-
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wis~ have be~n d~scharged from said prison. 
· An 1n~ormation filed under this section shall 
be filed 'in the county in which the alleged 
offense is committed, and the case shall be 
tried in such county, urrle'ss a change of venue 
is allowed as provided by law." 
This statute was enacted as part of the Laws of the 
State of Utah at the time of statehood. Revised Sta-
tutes 1898, Section 4114. At the tim·e of its incorp-
oration in 1898, it read as follows: 
"Every pri'Soner confined in the state 
prison for a term less than for life, who es-
capes, or attempts to escape therefrom, is 
punishable by imprisonmenlt in the state pris-
on for a term n'ot less than one year nor more 
than ten years; said second term of imprison-
ment to commence from the time he would 
have otherwise h!ave been discharged from 
said prison." 
The statute was amended in 1915, Laws of Utah 
191'5, Chapter 3, Section 1, to expand the circum-
stances when a convict's escape would be deemed 
escape from the prison ~o include convict camps 
and other pJace'S of confinement attendant to the 
State Prison. In addition, 1a clause was added relat-
ing to the procedural venue in such cases. No change 
was made in the provision relating to the type of 
person whlo was subject to convicti1on for es'cape at 
the time of the enactment of the provision relating 
to punishment for e'Scape in 1'898. 
Robbery, the crime for which the appeUants in 
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the instant case were confined, was punishable for 
a pt•riod of not less than three year~s nor for more 
than twenty years, at the time the escape statute was 
enacted. Howevlll', the indeterminate sentence Law 
wa~ not yet in effect. Offenses punishable by life 
imprisonment at the time were murder, Revised 
Statutl's 1898, Section 416:2, dueling, Revised Sta-
tutes 1898, Chapter 20, and rape, Revised Statutes 
1898, Section 4217. These offenses were the only ones 
for which a trial judge could directly impose a maxi-
mum sentence of life imprisonment. In 1913 the 
Legisbture passed the indeterminate sentence law, 
77-:~5-20, U.C.A. 1953, and provided that it should 
become effective on May 12, 1919, Laws of Utah 
1913, Chapter 100. This provided that the trial court 
would no longer make a specific sentence, butt rather 
the sentence would be indetermina1te, subject to the 
power of the Board of Pardons to determine the 
release date of the convict from the State Prison. 
The essential question for determination by 
thi~ court is whether the provision "term less than 
life" as used in 76-50-2, U.C.A. 1953, should en-
compass those crimes which have a m'aximum limit 
of life imprisonn1ent but are actually indeterminate 
in nature. It is submited that it should not. At the 
time of the enactment of the escape statute a spe-
cific term of imprisonment by the trial court for 
life was necessary before an individual was serving 
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a life sentence. The obvious intention of the Legis-
lature was to make unnecessary the trial and pun-
ishment of individuais who were already under man-
da!tory sentence for the rest of their lives. Such, 
however, is not the case with an individual who is 
serving an indeterminate sentence, for several rea-
sons. First, as a practical matter, these individuals 
can be terminated at any time land usually are long 
before they die in prison. Secondly, the indetermin-
ate sentence, although being subject to a maximum 
limit of life, is directed towards allowing the Board 
of Pardons substantial flexibility in treating the 
needs of any individual prisoner. Consequently, it 
is submitted that wha:t the Legislature contemplated 
by the provision in the escape sta!tute o'f a term less 
than life was that 1a life term be a specific term, 
and 'Consequently that only individuals serving life 
sentences under first degree murder, dueling, kid-
napping, etc., should be deemed as being inaivi-
duals serving sentences of life imprisonment. 
Conceding as above noted; that several Utah 
cases have said that an indetermina\te sentence is 
a sentence to the maximum term, in State v. N emier, 
106 U·tJah 307, 148 P.2d 32·7, this court had occa-
sion to consider whether or not an individual who 
was serving an indeterminate sentence for robbery 
from five years to life was serving a life sentence 
as that term was used in Section 103-7-12, U.C.A. 
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HH:~, which made an ~assault with a deadly weapon 
upon a guard subject to a mandatory death sentence. 
In that case this court noted that a person serving 
such indeterminate sentence W1as not serving a life 
~entence within the meaning of the substantive sta-
tutP. The court stated: 
"Our convict assault statute now 103-7-
12 U.C.A. 1943, first appeared as Ch'apter 
10: page 8, Laws of Utah 1909, it was prior 
to the enactment of 'the indeterminate sentence 
law, now Section 105-36..:20, U.C.A. 1943, 
which first appeared as Chapter 100, page 
192, Laws of Utah 1913. At that time the 
court was required in 1all ,cases to pass a de-
finite sentence within the limits provided by 
the statute. Under the law as it then existed 
a person convicted of a crime carrying a mini-
mum penalty of less than life and a maximum 
penalty of life, would not undergo a life sen-
tence, unless the tria'l judge, in view of aN of 
the facts and circumstances brought to his 
attention, pronounced a definite sentence of 
life imprisonment. Such cases were no doubt 
comparatively few. But under 1the indetermin-
ate sentence law, except in murder and trea-
son cases, the trial court cannot fix a definite 
term, but must pass sentence of imprisonment 
for a period of not less than the minimum 
and not more than the maximum provided by 
h.w. Thus if all persons serving a sentence, 
the maximum term of which is ror life, are 
undergoing a life sentence under the convict 
assault statute, the number of persons com-
ing within that statute was grea:tly enlarged 
by the enactment of the indeterminate sen-
tence Lnv. If, however, we take the other view, 
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t~a.t on~y such persons who a~e serving a de-
fnnte hfe term are undergoing a life sen-
tence, then all cases under the indeterminate 
sentence which carries a minimum of less 
than life cannot poss1ibly come within the pro-
visions of this statute, although some of them 
might have under the law before the enact-
ment of the indeterminate sentence law. The 
argument that the death penalty was provid-
ed in this statute because there is no other 
punishment that can be 1inflic!ted on a person 
undergoing a life sentence is not tenable be-
cause the Board of Pardons can and does 
commute death penalty and life sentences, as 
well as those of less severity, and in consider-
ing. each case, the behavior of the applicant 
while serving his lterm is an important fac-
~tor. 'The fact thrut the death penalty was made 
mandatory indicated that this statute was 'in-
tended to app1ly to only the most hardened 
criminals, and was ndt intended to be extend-
ed to an cases where the maximum penalty is 
life imprisonment. 
"In the recent case of State v. Walsh, 
106 Utah 22, 144 P.2d 757, we held that an 
indeterminate sentence of from one to ten 
years, is not a sentence of not less than three 
years, as that term is used in the habitual 
criminal statute. Practically all of the reasons 
there given for that decision apply with equal 
force to the facts of this case. We therefore 
hold that a person serving a sen.tence of .!rom 
five years to life under our 1ndeterm1nate 
sentence law, is not undergoing a life sentence 
as that term is used in Sec. 103-7-12 and ~hat 
this deeis'ion must therefore be reversed. Smce 
the offense denounced in section 103-7-11, 
U.C.A. 1943, would be an included offense 
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within the offense denounced in section 103-
7-12, the case is remanded to the district court 
for a new trial." 
The same reasons applicable to the situation in 
State v. Nemier, supra, and State v. Walsh. ].06 
Utah 22, 144 P.2d 757, are applicable here. 
The Legislat~ obviously intended that indi-
viduals be brought before the courts to determine 
their criminal responsibility for escapes rather than 
to have an administrative determination made by 
the Board of Pardons. Close constitutional ques-
tions would rise on the horizon were th'is court 'to 
hold to the contrary . .Nlthough the Board of Pardons 
would undoubtedly have authority to extend the in-
determinate commitment to whatever degree it felt 
necessary within the maximum limrts of the sen-
tence, the procedures attendant to court trial with 
the right to jury trial and legal counsel make a court 
procedure more compatible with due process of law. 
It is submitted, therefore, that a narrow ·construc-
tion should be given the phrase "less than life," not 
only for the purpose of maintaining prison disci-
pline, but also for the benefit of the prisoner who 
may be suspected or accused of escape, to make cer-
tain that he is, in fact, gu'ilty of the crime of e~scape 
before his chance of termination is disregarded. A 
substantial argument in favor of a narrow con-
struction of the phrase "less than life" can be made 
apart from the legislative and judicial considera-
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tions argued above, the most obvious reason being 
that prison discipline and 'control are better main-
tained. Individuals serving indeterminate sentences 
with life maximum are 'given cl'ear warning that 
misconduct will result in judicial proceedings and 
a firm sentence being imposed against them to begin 
after the'ir present sentence ends. These factors con-
tribute substantially to the internal discipline of 
the prison and obviously must have motivated the 
Legislature at the time of statehood. 
In McCoy v. Severson, 118 Utah 502, 222 P.2d 
1058, a peti:Uon was fi'led by a prisoner who was 
convicted of the crime of robbery and the crime 
of murder. The murder sentence was commuted to 
25 years by the Board of Pardons, and the peti-
tioner argued that the sentence should be deemed 
to run concurrently with the sentence for 'the rob-
bery convicti'on, since, if the murder sentence, which 
was originally to life, had been deemed to run con-
secutiv~y to the robbery sentence, the prisoner would 
be serving two terms of life imprisonment, one to 
run subsequent to the other. This court analyzed the 
legislative history !and concluded that there was noth-
ing inconsistent between 'the statute requiring that, 
in the absence of spe'C~ific direction, sentences run 
consecutively, and the indeterminate sentence law. 
The court made it clear that the indeterminate sen-
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"The indeterminate sentence law does not 
cover all situations. Here, the petitioner was 
eonvicted of two distinct offenses and two 
separate judgments .were imJ?osed: While the 
board of pardons might require him to serve 
for the du1·ation of his natural life under 
the robbery conviction, there are situations 
where the m1aximum term provided by law 
for one sentence is not of sufficient length to 
adequately puni'sh a defendent for commit-
ting numerous offenses. If the legislature in-
tended that the indeterminate sentence act 
should repeal the other provisions of the sta-
tutes dealing with imprisonment, i't did not 
say so. * * *" 
The court determined, based on certain Oalifornia 
ca~es, that merely because an 'individual is under a 
judicial sentence of life imprisonment he should 
not be immune from punishment for subsequent 
misconduct. This court, commenting on the Calif-
ornia cases and adopting their reasoning stated: 
"Similar reasoning is appl'ica:ble in this 
case to establish that petitioner was not serv-
ing two sentences, each of which ·compelled 
hin1 to be incarcerated for the rem,ainder of 
his natural life. 'The Constitution and statutes 
of this state provide that the board of par-
dons may 'commute punishments an'd grant 
pardons .after convictions, in all cases except 
treason and impeachments.' Section 6'7-0-1, 
U.C.A. 1943, and Const. Art. VII, Sec. 12. 
Under the authority of those enactments the 
board of pardons was given authority to make 
certain that \vhich was uncertain and to les-
sen the period of confinem·ent on life sen-
tences. A realistic approach to the problem 
11 
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suggests that neither a sentence for life nor 
a sentence of from five years to life means 
~hat ~ defendant will serve his natural life 
tn prtson There would have been no occasion 
to permit the termination or commu1ta'tion 
of sentences if the legislature intended that 
t~e ~terms could not be made les1S. For al'l prac-
tical purposes, a sentence for life must be 
considered in connection with the powers of 
ltJhe board of pardon's to commute the sentence 
to a fixed and shorter period. * * *" 
The reasoning of the McCoy case is directly ap-
plicable to ~the instant circumstances. Certainly, as 
a practical matter, a sentence to an indeterminate 
term for 1ife 'is not a sentence to life imprisonment, 
:and unless ~a specific life term is given, such as a 
first degree murder, substantial reason exi1S1ts for 
prosecuting an escape. It is submitted, therefore, 
1that the trial court's de termination that an inde-
terminate term of five years to life was not a life 
term ~ithin the meaning of 76~50-2, U.C.A. 1953, 
was correct. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS ARTHUR JEROME PHILLIPS AND 
WILLIAM D. MORRELL HAVING BE'EN GIVEN CON-
DITIONAL TERMINATION DATES ON THEIR ORI-
GINAL INDETERMINATE SENTENCES BY THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS 'WERE NOT SEHVING LIFE 
SENTE·NCES AT THE TIME OF THEIR ATTE1MPTED 
ESCAPE. 
The record discloses that two of the three ap-
pellants, Arthur Jerome Phillips and William D. 
Morrell, had at 1the time of their a·ntempted escape 
12 
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received conditional termination dates from the 
Board of Pardons. It was clear, therefore, that the 
Board, having exercised its jurisdiction, had in ef-
fect limited their sentences to a term for years term-
inating in 1966. In su<!h an instance it is submitted 
that the individual is certainly no longer serving a 
life term within the meaning of 76-50-2, U.C.A. 
1953, and consequen1tly, appellants Arthur Jerome 
Phillips and William D. Morrell should not be con-
sidered as having been subject to 11ife sentences if 
the cou1-t determines ~hat the respondent's argu-
ment in Point I of thils btief 'should be rejected. 
CONCLUSFON 
It is subm'i tted tha!t the Legislature did not 
intend 'an individual serving an indeterminate sen-
tence under law, even though that 'sentence may carry 
a maximum limit of life, to be deemed to be an in-
dividual serving a term less than life as that pro-
vision is used in the statute making criminal, es-
capes from a State Prison. Proper judicial adminis-
tration, statutory construction and sound reasons 
of public policy dietate to the contrary. It is sub-
mitted the decision of the 'trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PR~TT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
13 
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